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to the difficulties raised by the use of models and simulation. The increasing development of e-regulation could compromise fundamental values by embedding biases, software errors, and mistaken assumptions deeply into government procedures. The article therefore discusses the connections between the 'Internet of Things', the development of 'Ambient Law', and how the use of ICT in e-regulation can be a support for or an impediment to the operation of the rule of law. It concludes that e-government research should give more attention to the processes of regulation, and that law should be a more central discipline for those engaged in this activity.
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Smart Government and the Rule of Law: The Need for Interdisciplinarity
The practice of regulation-government efforts to identify and intervene in social, environmental, and economic issues in an iterative and ongoing fashion-is becoming an increasingly important feature of the present day [5, pp. 1-2] . In a similar fashion to many other organizations (both public and private), regulators are adopting information and communications technology (ICT) on a wide scale [64, 35, 84] , and while this brings benefits, it can have unexpected and unforeseen consequences. In an early, but brief, case study of the Parking Adjudicators tribunal in London, Sheppard and Raine highlight the importance of the role of ICT in administrative procedures, stating 'the IT systems in place at [the Tribunal] have a significant impact upon the shape and style of the adjudication process and on the supporting administration.' [122, p. 330] This article expands on that insight and considers how the 'shape and style' of government may change as it becomes more 'smart', relying on software, databases, and distributed devices. Its focus is chiefly on the routine but rarelyexamined internal processes of regulation, rather than on how external actors engage with regulatory initiatives. It uses a legal perspective, founded on the fundamental value of the rule of law, to highlight the benefits and issues that arise from these new developments and considers how the application of ICT may impact on adherence to the rule of law in this an unreflective implementation of computer technology in regulatory processes, particularly models and simulation. The penultimate section connects this thread to basic legal values through an overview of the rule of law and how it may come under pressure in a technological government. The concluding section argues for a greater focus on regulation in e-government research, and the inclusion of law within the disciplines upon which this relies.
Defining Basic Terms: The Is and Es of a Smart State
Despite its importance in practice, what is considerably less studied than e-government and has little associated theory is the use of ICT within the operations of regulators and those who deal with them, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as an integral part of the process of measurement, assessment, and feedback which is central to regulation, something which I label 'e-regulation'. However, before exploring this, four other terms must be defined at this point: regulation, information systems (IS), information infrastructures (II), and egovernment.
Narrow and Broad Conceptions of Regulation
Regulation, broadly defined, is any mechanism to control human behaviour. Scholars have put forward a number of different definitions of regulation, highlighting different aspects of a multi-faceted topic [57, p. 295] . One of the fundamental and often-cited definitions takes a broad perspective on what constitutes a regulatory system: "… [A]ny control system in art or nature must by definition contain a minimum of … three components … There must be some capacity for standard-setting, to allow a distinction to be made between more or less preferred states of the system. There must also be some capacity for information-gathering or monitoring to produce knowledge about current or changing states of the system. On top of that must be some capacity for behaviour-modification to change the state of the system." [65, p. 23 Building on this, the definition of regulation used in this article is any means of social control and behaviour modification, whether coming directly or indirectly from the state or through pressure imposed by private parties (particularly NGOs), which is known as 'smart regulation' [55] . Further research is required in order to establish which definition is best suited to e-government research, or if a variety of approaches must be developed.
Nonetheless, this definition is further explained in Figure 1 , which shows the regulatory process in diagrammatic form, highlighting information flows and the use of ICT within regulatory agencies. It illustrates the focus of this article on the internal processes of government rather than on the relationship between the citizen and the state. 
Information Systems and Infrastructures
An IS is not simply technology but the result of 'the mutually transformational interactions' [76, p. 11] 
E-Government
The focus of this article is on the use of ICT within the processes of regulation. This can be understood as a sub-set of the broader topic of e-government, sometimes known as 'digital government' [115, p. 11] . Defining these terms completely is not possible [105] , but one 
A New Field of Study: E-Regulation
E-government research has tended to focus on the public face of government and on service delivery [7] , not on the use of ICT within the regulatory process. regulation. It has a number of significant features: its focus is on internal government processes; it relies on the wide availability inside and outside government to be economically and legally feasible; its fundamental ideological perspective is modernising; and it has important consequences for government operations and structures, but also for citizens and for basic constitutional values. E-regulation can include 'smart regulation'; the latter incorporates ideas of innovation, reflection, and the protection of values which the article argues for.
Cheaper, More, Quicker, Better, New: The Benefits of E-Regulation
There is much that is positive about the development of e-regulation. In broad terms, the five main advantages of ICT for the reform of public administration have been outlined by Heeks as:
 Cheaper: producing the same outputs at lower total cost.
 More: producing more outputs at the same total cost.
 Quicker: producing the same outputs of the same total cost in less time.
 Better: produce the same outputs at the same total cost in the same time, but to a higher quality standard. 489-05]. Information can come to the regulator more rapidly, and in turn be made available to the public more quickly, in a form that is more easily processed, understood, and acted upon.
ICT allows more detailed tracking and detection of human activity, particularly regulatory breaches through, for example, speed cameras. Regulation can be smarter through greater knowledge, and therefore targeted more closely at particular segments of the population.
Enforcement can be improved and made more efficient through, for example, remote sensing [85] . Digital technology may 'de-centre' government but also permits the more precise observation of the populace and more focused interventions [64, pp. 185-203] .
Associated with this is the possibility of a smarter regulatory process. ICT can more quickly highlight the occurrence of harms, particularly those caused by small-scale activity which only becomes damaging when aggregated. Regulatory innovations can be tried for short periods of time, in particular markets, or in specific geographic areas. The results of these 'experiments' can be analysed and used as the basis for revisions in the future, allowing for a more rapid evolution of best practice [38, pp. 162-64] .
There is, therefore, a new phenomenon of 'e-regulation', which builds on and is a part of egovernment reforms. It offers significant advantages for the state and the citizen, but the next section explores the difficulties and problems that may arise in practice.
Querying the 'March of Progress'
E-regulation can be the opposite of smart. ICT can remove discretion from individual decision-makers and place it with systems analysts, developers, and senior management [17] .
The role of frontline staff changes from that of 'street-level bureaucrat' to a much more limited 'screen-level bureaucrat' [130, p. 183] . Even if individuals retain discretion, the increasing monitoring, accountability, and transparency which ICT can provide may motivate them to follow rules strictly rather than flexibly, in a way that is detrimental to the rights of particular citizens [28, pp. 362-3] . ICT can accentuate existing imbalances of power and distort the political and regulatory processes. The important differences between the public and private sector must be borne in mind in order to avoid the inappropriate application of models that are successful in other, different domains [4, p. 323 ]. In the public sector, many of the potential savings (such as disintermediation or reduced transaction costs) and potential new income streams (such as commissions and fees, advertising) do not apply [138] . The processes of public administration are not linear, manufacturing operations [78, p. 13] . In addition, it is difficult to identify a direct relationship between investment in ICT and prosperity; just-in-time methods are not always appropriate; and clearly identifying the customer is difficult [99, pp. 10-11] . It is therefore important to study the limitations of egovernment and e-regulation.
ICT-based innovation does not automatically bring with it democratization [81] . The legal decision-making process is not a simple system, easily amenable to modelling through computerized logic and expert systems [3] . In addition, administrative, bureaucratic, and regulatory skills depend on knowledge which is held in individual minds and is difficult to extract and store in a strucutured retrieval system. Administration is therefore not easily restructured or made 'efficient' in a Taylorian fashion, and building a good 'institutional memory' requires more than a static database [78, 
Models in the Regulatory Process
In order to properly understand the role and application of information in the regulatory process, it is necessary to pay some attention to the uses of models and simulations. These play three significant roles: as a catalyst for policy where no regime exists; as a structure for regulatory decision-making; and as a mechanism for collaborative policy and strategy [41, pp. The creation and choice of models can have important social, political, and legal consequences, as they 'limit and direct regulatory power … [and] … the quality of models directly affects the quality of law and policy' [41, pp. 269-70] . The scientific models used in legislation may not be accurate or can often lag behind the state of the art. Indeed, the models themselves are only that: an attempt to understand a system rather than the system itself [41,
While it is claimed that 'it is well understood that models of complicated systems are not "truth machines," but primarily tools to generate insights relevant to decisions'[61, p. 426], the reality is different. Because natural systems are never closed, models are unverifiable [95] and attempts to make them more realistic by adding more parameters may (paradoxically) make them less accurate [94] . This is something which lawyers and policy-makers need to defining the common ground for debate, enforcing a consistent approach to problem, and highlighting solutions that are certain to fail [69] .
It is not always the case that legislators, policy-makers and the general public are sufficiently scientifically literate to understand the basis of a regulatory scheme. Bad science can displace good science. In addition, the general public and policy-makers do not always properly understand the scientific process of ' (1) In this technical construction of a 'selective reality', seemingly small differences in scientific or technological processes can make quite significant differences in the political, policy, and decision-making process. An excessive focus on the 'reality' seen by science risks the creation of a picture, based on incomplete and inaccurate data and excluding elements which are not susceptible to simple, quantifiable measurement, or whose interaction is not properly understood or calculable. ICT is not ideologically neutral but can have a significant impact on power relationships [139] . We must therefore be careful to critically evaluate the results of applying ICT for regulation: in practice, the results do not always match the promises. If we rely too much on an elite cadre of expert scientists, ICT, and numerical analysis, we may lose sight of the human element that should exist in all systems of government and and the core values which should underlie the regulatory process. We should instead subject any 'normative technology' to rigourous analysis [71] .
This section has highlighted the development of e-regulation, offered a preliminary definition, and provided a critique of its possible development. While positive about its potential, it has drawn attention to the political and social aspects of the deployment of ICT and the need to think in a non-deterministic way, and to the problems that can result from an unreflective reliance on sophisticated and technologically-based models of the world. The next section builds on this contextualisation of technology to highlight how these issues can damage fundamental legal values.
ICT and the Rule of Law
Having defined the topic of interest-the use of ICT within regulatory processes-and highlighted the problematic, non-deterministic and socially situated way in which these tools are applied in practice, this section draws connections between the foregoing and the However, the majority of the dealings that ordinary citizens will have with the law and the various arms and agencies of government will take place in the context of routine administrative procedures [43, p. 291] .
A conception of the rule of law in the context of ICT therefore must ensure adherence to the minimum requirements of formalist notions, particularly protecting legality while avoiding legalism; balance discretion, accountability, and transparency; and ensure respect for the individual, the independence of the decision-maker, and the fairness of the process. It must also embrace openness, pay attention to design issues, and function in a flexible, consultative fashion in order to avoid hidden biases. While the upholding of the rule of law may make the design and implementation of a regulatory system more complex, it should lead to a better functioning system in the long run [110, p. 170 ], a truly 'smart government'.
ICT as an Enabler of 'Ambient Law'
It is also necessary to place this discussion in the context of the possible future development of the so-called 'Internet of Things'. ICT is being used in public administration to an everincreasing extent. This is a process that is likely to accelerate with time, and become more distributed and localised. Some consideration of an extreme example will help to highlight how this might interfere with basic valuess. Bullinga predicts, perhaps with some hyperbole (and certainly with an overoptimistic faith in the capacity of software developers to produce error-free code), a future of omnipresent and ambient technology with a significant regulatory The scenarios above are no doubt pleasing for those charged with the implementation of regulation but are as unrealistic as the over-enthusiastic claims that electricity would remove 'disease and strife' [22, pp. 88-9] . Very few of these ideas are yet embodied in real devices [109, p. 120] . They are probably never fully attainable [46, p. 276, 32] because of technical, financial, and privacy constraints [93] .
It is certainly not the case that 'smart' regulators are allowing computers to make decisions for them. It is questionable whether any complex legal decision-making can be automated to this extent [26, p. 62, 67, p. 565, 77] . The issue I am raising is not a distant dystopia of unquestioning control by machines, but the extent to which reliance on software may subtly and invisibly alter the regulatory process in ways that invisibly erode the protections encapsulated in the rule of law. If Zouridis is correct, and 'the major challenge the rule of law will face in the next decades is the movement from the rule of law as an abstract doctrine to the rule of law as real governmental practice' [141, p. 90] , there is a clear need to consider in detail how the tools which are used by modern bureaucrats affect the bringing to reality of the values which underpin this fundamental notion.
The widespread use of ICT as an element in a regulatory system raises important issues with regard to individual privacy and autonomy, as our every move may be tracked and automated systems may invisibly intervene in order to manipulate the information on which we base decisions or to mistakenly conclude that we have transgressed a rule that we have, in fact, observed [62] . Lanzara highlights that the final outcome may not be a utopia of complete cybernetic control, but one in which 'many government functions and mechanisms are inscribed in and delegated to the technology, which then "acts" as a regulatory regime with enforcement capabilities.' [73, p. 37] Gil-Garcia acknowledges that this could lead to 'a new vision of a dangerously powerful government' [46, p. 276 ].
The study of ICT and its relationship to legal and regulatory systems is a topic that is still in its infancy as the subject of academic attention, although its consequences are pervasive and the potential resulting improvement or dis-improvement in public services are obviously important to all citizens [63, pp. 165-6] . What literature does exist is focused on intellectual property [90] and the challenges for legal practitioners [128, 129, 127] . The focus is on 'code as law' [79] (the ways in which software can constrain consumers more effectively than legal rules) or perhaps 'code meets law' [133] (the interaction between the two types of rules in property regulation) but not on 'law through code' (in the sense of software implementations of regulatory schemes) [For isolated examples, see 25, 24] . Issues arising from the use of expert systems in law were discussed in the 1990s [42] , but this technology has not developed to the extent expected at the time. The use of computers for legal decision making was studied in Scandanavia in the early 1990s [13, perspective on e-government may undermine the legitimacy of democracy [124, 45] .
ICT as a Support for the Rule of Law
ICT may be both a support and an impediment to the rule of law, particularly by providing citizens with access to information on court procedures and legislation [104, pp. 38-9] .
Online capabilities also open possibilities for 'reputation-based governance', providing citizens with easy access to the information that they need to assess different proposals in a standardised fashion and thus making the State 'legible' to its citizens [101] . Nonetheless, despite the possible positive outcomes from the widespread use of ICT in legal and regulatory systems, details matter. What little initial research has been done indicates that the results can be 'very uneven and mixed' [140, p. 11] , and the Internet has proven to be both 'an instrument of bureaucratic control and of personal liberation, a conduit of communal ideals and of corporate profits.' [22, p. 110] It is therefore necessary to spend some time considering how ICT can be a barrier to the effective implementation of the rule of law.
ICT Impeding the Rule of Law
A technocratic administration may in fact present serious challenges to the ideal of the rule of law. A common complaint regarding modern lawmaking is that it is labyrinthine, opaque, and not easily accessible to the public-what the legal futurist Susskind has referred to as 'hyperregulation' [128, pp. 12-8] . This problem is likely to be accentuated, rather than ameliorated, by the use of ICT. ' " [T] ranslating" open legal norms into rigid technical code' is by no means straightforward and requires careful and detailed consideration [62, pp. 452-3] .
Elaborating the rule of law in practice is problematic because, as Davis highlights, discretion extends not only to 'substantive choices' but also to questions of procedure, method, forms, and so on [34, p. 4] . A shift from paper-based methods of bureaucracy to computerized systems will change the way in which internal processes operate in a way that makes them significantly more opaque, less equitable, and less open to legal challenge. As Zouridis and Development errors make regulatory schemes implemented through software deeply problematic from the perspective of legal theory because all such systems have four characteristics that make them potentially subversive of the rule of law: [51] . These decision-making (and ultimately, enforcement) systems will not be amenable to straightforward examination or easy challenge by those affected [48, pp. 144-7] . Decision-making processes are being supported or even implemented through software which is not available to the public, amenable to unskilled scrutiny or accessible to the putative decision-makers themselves [25, pp. 1254-5] .
It is also often very difficult to challenge an adjudication made by computer [125, p. 102] .
Computerized consistent implementation of rules removes the possibility of individual discretion [25, p. 1253] . 'Closed' systems, with source code not available to the public, render opaque the fact-gathering and decision-making processes for which they are used, thus reducing the accountability of public officials and reducing the possibility of effective input from civil society and skilled professionals [24, p. 357 ].
For example, Parkin highlights how a seemingly simple requirement that the attendance of a recipient of welfare in New York City be positively recorded on a computer system by a caseworker tilts the system against individuals. Any 'non-attendance' results in a loss of benefits, and therefore if a caseworker forgets to record a meeting or a legitimate excuse, there are financial consequences for the recipient [98, pp. 1357-8] . These minor shifts in the rules may have legitimate roots in clearly articulated and promulgated laws, in which case they are unobjectionable from a formal perspective, but they may also be due to misunderstandings or mistakes on the part of systems developers. Unthinking implementation of computer-based systems can have effects which fundamentally undermine the rule of law, natural justice and due process.
Allan highlights how 'the wooden application of rules to inappropriate cases is often unfair' [2, 128 (emphasis in original)]; the problem is multiplied when the application is algorithmic:
"Seemingly, algorithms could be a boon to due process because they formalize decisionmaking procedures. … At the same time, algorithms may involve rules of such complexity that they defy attempts to trace their reasoning. Is this the perfect perversion of due process: the uniform application of an inarticulable rule?" [8, pp. 8-9] The design of computer systems that reduce the possibility of human error requires effort [111] . While systems generally work well, results are not guaranteed [52] . The legal basis of the systems may be incompletely documented, obscure or mistaken [114, pp. 336-41] . It is difficult to 'translate' from the natural language of statute to the formal and limited language of computer programming [113, p. 132] , particularly when legislation has a deliberately open texture [113, p. 134] . In the worst cases, programmers may make mistakes when developing systems that implement statutory or regulatory rules [25, pp. 1268-71] , or policy-makers may avoid more effective schemes because they will be difficult to automate [25, p. 1255] .
Identifying systemic or cognitive bias in decision-making is already difficult [43, p. 438] without adding the impenetrability of computers. Databases may contain systematic errors because of biases in the ways in which they are constructed, such as the undercounting of particular racial or ethnic groups in a census, or the unequal willingness of different socioeconomic groups to report problems to their local authority [68, pp. 2-4] . These biases will tend to be towards the 'knowable and measurable … as well as towards existing types of metrics.' [6, p. 705] These problems are compounded by the fact that a legal review of computer-assisted decisions would need to compare the source code to the law, something which will be outside the competence of most lawyers [13, p. 205] . A prominent example of this is in access to source code for breathalyser devices [123, 97, 80, 137] .
ICT can seriously hamper the ability of administrators and regulators to gather and process the information that is necessary for their decision making. This claim may initially seem counter-intuitive-ICT seems to make it much easier to assemble and assimilate information-but once a dedicated information system is put in place, this will constrain what can and cannot be brought to the attention of the regulator. Of course, regulatory processes have long depended on the collection of structured data through forms, but a computer-based form is even less flexible as it is often impossible to ignore 'required fields' (even if they do not apply) or to add additional information in the margins.
ICT can also constrain the hearing of an individual's case. The computer system will often follow a fixed 'script', which enrols and constructs both administrator and citizen into a particular pattern of interaction. It can be difficult (although not impossible) to deviate from this. In practice, what is likely to happen is that, through force of habit, regulatory staff will simply follow familiar procedures without taking the time to consider if they are appropriate for the particular individual that they are dealing with.
ICT can significantly channel internal processes. This is not always inappropriate; indeed, properly applied business process re-engineering can go a long way towards improving the efficiency of a regulator-but can lead to inflexibility over time. ICT can also lead to bias within the system. This can sometimes be obvious but may also be quite insidious, difficult to identify, and even more difficult to root out. This use of new technology in government may challenge the ideals underpinning the rule of law in a number of ways. Bowker and Star claim that the use of ICT means that 'values, opinions, and rhetoric are frozen into codes, electronic thresholds and computer applications.' [18, p. 187 ] Although speed, flexibility, and responsiveness are often ascribed to modern ICT, the reality is often more prosaic. Software development is notoriously difficult, with many high-profile failed public sector projects, and systems may, in fact, become 'encrusted … with earlier ways of thinking' [12, p. 156] , too costly to modify, and a barrier to change. This fossilization of policy in ICT goes beyond what would already take place in a nontechnocratic bureaucracy because modifications to ICT are generally not possible in the short term, shortcomings in the system are too expensive to work around, even on a small-scale, and the costs, complexity, and difficulty of ICT have tended to grow over time. These difficulties make administrators reluctant to make minor changes to such systems; and many organizations outsource their ICT operations, which imposes additional barriers to change in the short term [35, pp. 25-7] .
This section has defined 'thin' and 'thick' conceptions of the rule of law, explained how ICT can enable the developing phenomenon of 'Ambient Law', and shown how such embedding of legal constraints into everyday software and hardware objects may be the opposite of 'smart', with technology becoming a tool of unfairness and a barrier to change.
The next, and final, section summarises the argument made and concludes that e-regulation and legal questions should be a key focus for e-government research.
Conclusion
This article had three objectives: first, to propose a new field of study, 'e-regulation', which it has defined as the use of ICT by regulators and those who deal with them, such as regulated entities, NGOs, and ordinary citizens, as an integral part of the process of measurement, assessment, and feedback which is central to regulation. Second, the article set out to critique the resulting application of ICT for schemes of government regulation. While generally positive about these developments, it has identified eregulation as a possible cause of inflexibility, disempowerment, and ossification. It is particularly important to avoid the simplistic adoption of private sector frameworks and approaches in public sector IS development. It is also necessary to be aware of the limitations of models and simulations as a tool in regulatory processes, as these can constraint debate, decision-making, and discovery of salient facts if they are not carefully used.
Finally, it sought to highlight the connections between so-called 'smartness', the Internet of Things, and the rule of law. It has presented an argument that the increased use of ICT in government, and specifically in regulatory regimes, is a significant development with potentially negative consequences for the proper application of the rule of law in the routine work of government. With the move towards 'Ambient Law', the biases, assumptions, and mistakes that may be embedded in widely-distributed and difficult to avoid information systems should be a topic of urgent concern for researchers and academics in ICT, IS and law.
However, there is little interchange between these disciplines.
In response to these challenges, and in the hope of achieving the greatest possible benefit from these new tools, this article has highlighted the need to ensure that lawyers are involved in the details of planning such systems. It has also underlined the point made by other scholars that it is essential that legal rules must be embedded into the 'smart environment' in a reflective way which protects basic values, such as the rule of law. In conclusion, this article argues that e-government researchers must include the poorly-understood processes of regulation, which is a central activity in present day government, in the activities which they study; and must include a deep consideration of law (and the basic values which law seeks to protect) as a central discipline in their research.
